Navy photo

Three nuclear-powered supercarriers — Reagan, Roosevelt, and Nimitz — and their escorts exercise together in the Pacific.

As someone who played a key role in building defense budgets, Mark Cancian of CSIS knows whereof he speaks when he analyzes one. Here are his top five surprises in the first Biden Administration defense budget request. Read on! The Editor.

Many elements of the Biden Administration’s first defense budget had been signaled ahead of time: focus on climate, cuts to “legacy” platforms, and an emphasis on developing future technologies.

What were the surprises? Unchanged Army end strength, a strong nuclear modernization program, the absence of new unmanned systems, a resilient F-35 program, and a shrinking Navy.

The Shrinking Navy!

Most observers had expected an increase in the Navy’s shipbuilding accounts with this budget, especially after the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, said that, even as an Army general, he would support budget increases for the Navy and Air Force in light of the Chinese threat.

But this budget decommissions 12 ships early (seven cruisers, five previously planned plus two additional, an LPD amphibious ship, and four LCSs) and buys relatively few replacements. Some of the ship decommissionings, especially the cruisers and amphib, had been expected since the Navy has fought with Congress about extending their service lives. However, the LCSs had only been in service four to nine years out of a potential 30-year lifespan. The budget proposes buying only eight battle force ships, of which four are combatants (one DDG 51, one frigate, and two Virginia-class submarines). Assuming a 30-year service life, that implies a fleet of only 240 ships.

The Obama administration had set the fleet size at 308 ships. The Trump administration increased that to 355 ships, which Congress codified into law. Mark Esper, just before he resigned as Defense Secretary, proposed a fleet of “500+” ships that included a large number of unmanned vessels. Although congressional members have expressed skepticism about such a high target, many Democrats, particularly those from shipbuilding districts, have endorsed some naval expansion.

In the past, the Navy accelerated the deactivation of ships to save money, for example, in the early 1970s and in the 1990s. However, after the declines, it has never been able to build the numbers back up to where they were. Thus, the Navy is likely to be headed for a smaller fleet (290 manned ships?), though one that is younger and more capable.

Unchanged Army End Strength.

Mark Cancian

Most observers expected the Army’s troop- numbers would shrink to help pay both for Army internal programs and for Navy and Air Force programs designed to counter China. The Army’s budget was, indeed, cut by $3.6 billion (though some of that reflects reduced operations in Afghanistan), but the end strength cut did not happen, at least not yet.

The budget proposes an Army end strength of 485,000, essentially its level today. The Army was quite upfront that its priorities were end strength, readiness, and modernization, so it protected end strength at the cost of other elements. Historically, the Army has prioritized personnel and end strength, seeing them as its institutional core.

Further, the Army had been on a strategic communications campaign to argue that its size needed to be sustained. The Army points to its major role in the Pacific with ballistic missile defense, long-range precision fires, and theater-wide logistics. It also argues that its extensive day-to-day deployments put a floor on its size. These efforts seem to have paid off, at least in the short term.

The Army remains in a precarious position. Strategists see it as a bill payer for other priorities, particularly naval and air. Many elements of its program will decline in FY 2022―readiness, training, and modernization―as Tom Spoehr at Heritage Foundation notes. The bottom line: the Army will need more money if it wants to hold onto its people.

Vibrant Nuclear Modernization.

Arms-control advocates have been hammering the Biden administration about curbing nuclear modernization, arguing that the effort is “unnecessary and costly.” The Democratic Party’s platform denounced “the reckless embrace of a new arms race.”

But the Biden Administration’s first budget strongly supports all three legs of the triad. The three major nuclear modernization programs all would receive funding increases and large budgets: B-21 (+$30M, to nearly $3 billion), Columbia class ballistic missile submarine (+$509M to $5 billion), and the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD, +$1.1 billion, to $2.6 billion).

This nuclear budget did not come out of thin air. The Obama administration developed a nuclear modernization package in 2010 as a complement to New START. The United States would reduce its nuclear forces but modernize the remainder. Although Democrats have been expected to continue with the Obama program (and many Biden administration officials served in the Obama administration), some programs are vulnerable. The long-range standoff missile (LRSO), a nuclear-tipped cruise missile, had been part of the Obama program, but the arms-control community opposed it strongly. Still, the program’s proposed funding increased by $224 million, to $609 million. GBSD had always been controversial with arms-control advocates for reasons of both cost and vulnerability, but the Biden budget sustained it.

Funding the nuclear modernization programs may be, in part, a negotiating tactic for expected arms-control negotiations with Russia, and, conceivably, China. There is no point in giving away bargaining chips before the negotiation even begins. Further, the administration will conduct a nuclear posture review that might set a different path. Nevertheless, it would be hard to back away from the FY 2022 commitment to these programs without strong justification.

Few Drones Requested

Repeated statements about the need for new technologies, new operating concepts, and the importance of innovation would have led one to believe that unmanned systems would receive a large boost. In fact, they are just sputtering along. Indeed, the Pentagon will divest itself of a range of large drones if the budget is approved. The Air Force plans to divest MQ-4 block 30 Global Hawks; the Navy to divest its remaining four BAMS-D, and the Marine Corps to divest the disappointing RQ-21s.

The services plan to buy few unmanned aircraft. The Army, for its part, plans to 60 manned aircraft and no major unmanned systems. The Air Force buys 91 manned aircraft, no unmanned systems. The Department of the Navy buys 101 manned aircraft and six unmanned aircraft. The Navy buys no MQ-4C Tritons, continuing a multiyear “pause” for additional development and continues development of the MQ-25 as a refueling aircraft (but no procurement yet). The Marine Corps buys six “Medium Altitude Long Endurance-Tactical (MALE-T) Unmanned Aerial Systems,” which is odd budget nomenclature, lacking a name and designation. Budget details indicate that MALE-T is actually the MQ-9A Extended Range. (Note to Marine Corps: if your budget presentation is unclear about what you are asking for, that will be a red flag to Congress.)

Overall, this Air Force and Navy funding balance between manned and unmanned does not indicate a change in approach. Indeed, it constitutes a resounding endorsement of manned over unmanned systems.

The Persistence Of The F-35.

One year ago, the F 35 program seemed to be stable, having reached a steady production level and established control over its schedule and cost (though not quite over its operational tests and performance). Then, Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, denounced the program: “I want to stop throwing money down that particular rat hole.” The Joint Staff planned a review of tactical aviation programs with an expectation of changing the mix. Gen. Brown, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, promised a clean sheet design of Air Force tactical aviation. The vultures seemed to be circling.

But the 2022 budget request gives no indication of serious trouble. Total program spending is down slightly but remains greater than $12 billion a year. The budget proposes buying 85 aircraft in 2022, down from 96 in FY 2021 but more than what had been requested in FY 2021 (79) before congressional adds. The Air Force requests 48 aircraft, the same level as requested in 2021 and about the the same level the Air Force has requested for several years.

The Marine Corps had signaled concerns about the F-35. Gen. David Burger had said in his commandant’s planning guidance: “It is unlikely that exquisite manned platforms represent a complete answer to our needs in future warfare… This means a significant increase in unmanned systems.” Yet, the Corps buys 22 F-35s, more than the 15 for the Navy.

When the administration completes all its strategic reviews, the hammer may still fall on the F-35, but it escaped the blow in this budget.

Of course, the 2022 budget is only an interim product since the Biden administration’s only had a few months to consider it. The administration could change course on these five items when the department completes its various strategic reviews. Those results will be published with the 2023 budget, the first week in February or perhaps, as the Trump administration did, a few weeks earlier. Nevertheless, the choices in FY 2022 establish facts on the ground…at least until Congress gets its say.